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Abstract
In this paper we provide empirical evidence on the wage incidence of the
German business tax, which is set at the municipal level. For our analysis,
we use a very rich administrative linked employer-employee panel, covering 11
years, and link it to data on the business tax rates of about 11,500 German
municipalities. On average 8% of the municipalities adjust their business tax
rate per year. We are able to exploit multiple quasi-natural experiments to
identify the tax incidence on wages. The detailed administrative data allow
us to estimate heterogenous incidence effects and to explore different channels
of how the business tax burden is passed on. We find a wage elasticity with
respect to the effective marginal tax rate of -0.18. Low-skilled labor shares a
relatively higher burden as well as workers in firms with non-binding sectoral
collective agreements or firm level bargaining contracts.
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1 Introduction
The debate about who bears the burden of corporate taxation has recently shifted
from the theoretical to the empirical arena. Theoretically, the debate was initiated
by Harberger (1962)’s seminal work. Numerous studies have followed, converging to
the view that labor bears a substantial share of the corporate tax burden through
lower wages in open economies. Compared to the multitude of theoretical contribu-
tions, there are few empirical studies that are able to cleanly identify the incidence
of corporate taxation on wages.1 In addition, there is no empirical evidence on the
channels that firms might use to shift the burden of corporate taxation to their
workers. If the corporate tax rate rises, are incumbent workers denied the next pay
rise? Do potential new hires receive a lower wage offer? Moreover, to the best of
our knowledge, no empirical study has analyzed whether there is worker and firm
heterogeneity in the incidence of the corporate tax on wages. Do low-skilled workers
with a lower bargaining power share a relatively larger burden? Are firms under a
sectoral collective bargaining agreement less flexible in passing on the burden?
This paper is the first to provide micro worker and micro firm evidence on
the channels of the corporate tax incidence on wages.2 Our identifying variation
comes from the roughly 11,441 German municipalities which can annually adjust
the rate of the local business tax (LBT) (Gewerbesteuer).3 In the cross-section, the
business tax rate for corporate firms usually varies between 10% and 20% due to
different collection rates. In addition, there is substantial variation in the collection
rates within municipalities, due to variation over time: every year about 8% of the
municipalities (roughly 1,000 in total) adjust the collection rates, changing the local
business tax rate on average by 0.5 percentage points. This variation enables us to
exploit multiple local quasi-natural experiments to identify the effect.
In order to be able to explore different incidence channels and to look at
heterogenous firm and worker effects, we make use of a rich administrative linked
employer-employee dataset (LEED). We construct a panel of 11 years (from 1998 to
2008) and link it to administrative data on the universe of all German municipalities
during that period. The richness of the administrative LEED linked to community
1 A seminal study has been published recently as Arulampalam et al. (2012), others will be
discussed below.
2The related literature will be discussed in the next section.
3 More precisely, municipalities can set a municipality specific collection rate, which works as a
multiplier of the federal business tax rate. The LBT revenue mostly accrues to the municipality and
is its most important source of revenue. In the remainder of the paper we use the terms “corporate
tax(ation)” and “business tax(ation)” as synonyms unless this may give rise to confusion.
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level data allows us to address potential caveats which are especially important in
the German context. First, non-corporate and corporate firms are taxed differently
in Germany. Thus information on the legal form of the firm is crucial to identify an
effect. Second, labor unions still play a major role in the German wage formation
process. The employer part of the LEED allows us to control for union status. Last,
we need detailed worker level data to address questions of heterogenous worker
effects. In fact, the relative burden of high and low-skilled labor is most likely to be
different as the complementarity/substitutability between these labor inputs with
regard to capital is different (Griliches, 1969).
Our central estimate of the long-run wage elasticity with respect to the effec-
tive corporate tax rate is −0.18. We find that it takes up to two years until the
corporate tax burden is (partly) shifted to labor. Our results further suggest that
the burden is largely borne by incumbent workers. Worker groups that are more
vulnerable, such as low-skilled workers, women, part-timers and individuals with
low firm specific tenure share a relatively higher burden of the corporate tax. As
far as firm heterogeneity is concerned, we find significant industry difference in the
business tax incidence on wages. Following economic intuition, we find that firms
shift a larger share of tax burden to their workers if the wage bargaining takes place
at the firm level rather than at the sectoral level and if the collective agreement
is not binding, i.e. wages exceed the minimum wage stipulated in the agreement.
Moreover, more profitable firms seem to shift less of the burden.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a short
overview of the related literature. In Section 3 we sketch the tax treatment of
German firms in general and describe the German business tax in detail. The data
sources used for the empirical analysis are described in Section 4. Results are shown
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
The theoretical literature on the incidence of corporate taxation started from a
general equilibrium perspective. The seminal paper by Harberger (1962) showed
that capital bears the whole burden of corporate taxation in a closed economy.
Subsequently, the literature quickly evolved either extending the model to the open
economy case (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971; Bradford, 1978; Kotlikoff and Summers,
1987; Harberger, 1995), incorporating more sectors (Shoven, 1976) or introducing
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uncertainty (Ratti and Shome, 1977).4 Existing computational general equilibrium
(CGE) models find that labor bears roughly 40 percent of the corporate tax burden
when assuming a large open economy with reasonable portfolio, product and fac-
tor substitution elasticities (see Mutti and Grubert (1985); Gravelle and Smetters
(2006); Randolph (2006); Harberger (2008) and Gravelle (2010) for surveys).
As far as empirical evidence is concerned, there are only a few, rather recent
studies that try to identify the incidence of corporate taxation on wages. While
Hassett and Mahur (2006) find extremely high estimates of the wage incidence,
most other studies find a wage incidence of between 40 and 80 percent (Desai et al.,
2007; Felix, 2007; Felix and Hines Jr., 2009; Dwenger et al., 2011; Liu and Altshuler,
2011; Arulampalam et al., 2012).
The existing studies can be grouped into two clusters, based on the identify-
ing variation exploited to establish a causal link between changes in the burden of
corporate taxation and changes in wage. In the first set of studies, tax burdens vary
by countries (or US States) and the wage incidence is identified in macro regressions
by exploiting the variation in tax rates across countries (or US States) over time
(Hassett and Mahur, 2006; Felix, 2007; Desai et al., 2007; Felix and Hines Jr., 2009).
The second set of studies exploits cross- and within-firm (industry) variation in tax
liabilities (rates) to identify the effect (Dwenger et al., 2011; Liu and Altshuler,
2011; Arulampalam et al., 2012). In addition, studies using panel data implicitly
exploit reforms of firm taxation rules – in fact (Dwenger et al., 2011) do so explicitly.
With regard to the level of analysis, the study by Felix and Hines Jr. (2009) uses
individual worker data. Yet, they only have one cross-section at their disposal and
thus cannot control for individual specific fixed effects, which play a big role in wage
regressions.
The study most closely related to this paper is Bauer et al. (2012).5 The
authors use similar individual data and also exploit the variation in the local busi-
ness tax rate to identify the effect on wages. However, there are two important
differences. Firstly, Bauer et al. (2012) do not have worker information on the mu-
nicipality but only on the district level. They therefore aggregate the business tax
data to the county (Kreis) level – there are 11,441 municipalities but only 343 coun-
ties. This aggregation might be problematic for two reasons. First, it makes the
variation imprecise. Assume that only one municipality changes the tax rate in a
4 Recent surveys on the theoretical literature of the general equilibrium are provided by Auer-
bach (2005) or Harberger (2006).
5 This recently published paper was conducted independently of our study.
3
certain county. On the hand, the variation of this municipality is understated when
averaging the tax rates at the county level. On the other, using the county’s average
tax rates creates a spurious variation for all other municipalities, in which the tax
rate has not changed. This spurious variation hampers identification as some work-
ers and firms are treated as if they were affected by changes in the tax rate, although
they were not. In fact, every year 8% of the municipalities change the collection
rate, inducing changes of the average collection rate at the county level in between
65% to 75% of the counties (Bauer et al., 2012).6 Second, due to the aggregation to
the county level potential tax competition channels between municipalities in one
county cannot be accounted for. Another difference of our paper to Bauer et al.
(2012) is that we also make use of firm level micro data. This is crucial because
corporate taxation differs greatly for different firm types, depending on their legal
form (corporate vs unincorporated).7 Moreover, some firm types are not liable to
the business tax at all. Finally, the detailed firm data enables us to test for firm
heterogeneity in the incidence on wages.
Our study adds to the existing literature in three important ways. First, in
terms of identifying variation, we exploit numerous quasi-natural experiments of the
locally determined business tax. Additional identification comes from the conven-
tional variation in the cross-section, that is across roughly 11,500 municipalities and
across firm-types, and due to changes in the corporate tax laws set at the federal
level over time. Second, we are the first study to explicitly analyze the adjustment
channel through which firms shift parts of the corporate tax burden to wages. We
differentiate between a wage incidence effect for incumbent workers, which materi-
alizes through wage moderation, and the effect for potential new hires, which in the
case of a rise in the corporate tax rate, receive a lower wage offer than they would
have in the absence of a shock. Finally, we make use of administrative panel data
on individual wages, which are linked to a large firm sample. The linked employer-
employee data allow us to control for both observed and unobserved individual and
firm heterogeneity in the wage incidence. We are thus able to assess whether the
wages of different groups are affected differently by increases in the companies’ busi-
ness tax liabilities.
6 Note that early conference versions of this paper used the variation across counties and found
very different estimates than the ones presented below (Fuest et al., 2011, 2012).
7 In fact, we show very different results for corporate and non-corporate firms below.
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Figure 1: Revenues of company taxes
3 Institutional Background
Taxation of firms in Germany consists of three pillars: the personal income tax
(PIT), the corporate tax (CT) and the local business tax (LBT). Figure 1 shows
the total revenues of the three different taxes on firms for Germany. The local
business tax is the most important tax with a revenue of about e40 billion, which
corresponds to approximately 6 percent of Germany’s total tax revenue. There have
been several changes of the German corporate tax legislation affecting all three forms
of firm taxation in the recent years (see Table 1 in the Appendix for a synapsis).
The local business tax applies to both non-corporate (Personengesellschaften)
and corporate firms (Kapitalgesellschaften) – certain free professions such as jour-
nalists, physicians, lawyers or farmers are exempt. Since 1998, the LBT base, YLBT ,
essentially consists of operating profits.8 Until 2008 the business tax liabilities could
be deducted from their own tax base. Moreover, there is an allowance of e24,500
for non-corporate firms.
The tax rate of the local business tax, τLBT , consists of two components, the
basic federal rate (Steuermesszahl), τfed, and the collection rate (Hebesatz ), cr:
τLBT = τfed · cr. The basic federal rate was set at 5.0% from 1998 to 2007 and
decreased to 3.5% in 2008.9 The collection rate is set by the municipalities and
8 From 1998 to 2007 half of the long-term debt service was added to the YLBT . This changed
with the the tax reform of 2008. Instead of long-term debt services 25% of all interest payments
exceeding e100,000 are included in YLBT . The interest payments comprise a lump sum interest
portion of rents, leasing rates and royalties.
9 Note that prior to 2008 there was a reduced τfed for non-corporate firms. For every e12,000
exceeding the allowance of e24,500, τfed was raised by one percentage point, so that the full basic
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usually varies between 250% and 450% in the period from 1998 to 2008. It is the
most important instrument of the German municipalities, which can be influenced
by the municipalities themselves, to raise tax revenues.
In addition to the LBT, non-corporate firms (Personengesellschaften) are sub-
ject to the personal income tax. The tax base is the share of the operating profits
assigned to the proprietor. Importantly, until 2008, a share of the business tax
liabilities could be deducted from the personal income tax base.10 The taxable in-
come from running a business is added to taxable income from other sources and
the PIT schedule is applied. In most cases, profits of the firms are so high that
companies are in the highest PIT bracket and face the top marginal tax rate, τ topPIT ,
which changed several times during the period under consideration. In addition a
solidary surcharge, soli, for the German unification of 5.5% of the tax rate is added
(Solidarita¨tszuschlag).
Corporate firms (Kapitalgesellschaften) are subject to the corporate tax in
addition to the LBT. The tax base for the corporate tax is defined similarly to the
tax base of the personal income tax. The corporate tax rate has undergone several
changes in recent years. Until 2000 a corporate tax imputation system existed in
Germany, where retained profits where subject to a corporate tax rate, τCT , of 45%
in 1998 and 40% in 1999 and 2000.11 As of 2001 retained and distributed profits
were equally taxed at 25%.12 In 2008 τCT was lowered to 15%. As for the PIT, a
solidary surcharge, soli, of 5.5% of the tax rate is added.
In order to calculate the effective corporate tax burden for corporate (non-
corporate) firms, first, the local business tax burden as well as the corporate tax
(personal income tax) burden have to be determined. Second, the deductions of the
LBT liabilities from the PIT base and in some years from its own base have to be
taken into account. The effective marginal tax rate13 for corporate firms, τ corpEMTR ,
from 1998 to 2007 is thus14:
federal rate of 5.0% had to be paid with a taxable income starting from e72,500.
10 From 2001 to 2007, 1.8 · τfed · YLBT could be deducted. From 2008 onwards, 3.8 · τfed · YLBT
could be credited.
11Dividends were taxed at a rate of 30% from 1998 to 2000.
12In 2003 this rate was raised by 1.5 percentage points to finance the costs of a major flood in
Germany.
13Note that this is an effective statutory marginal tax rate, as opposed to measures of the effective
marginal tax burden on investment which include tax base parameters.
14 Since 2008 the denominator of the fraction is set to 1, since the local business tax cannot be
deducted from its own tax base anymore.
6
τ corpEMTR =
τCT · (1 + soli) + τfed · cr
1 + τfed · cr (1)
The effective marginal tax rate for a non-corporate firm, where the owners are
in the top income tax bracket, τnon−corpEMTR , is15:
τnon−corpEMTR =
τ topPIT · (1 + soli) + τfed · cr
1 + τfed · 1.8 (2)
4 Data
For our analysis we combine two distinct data sources. First, administrative data
on the universe of German municipalities containing information on their fiscal and
budgetary situation and, second, detailed administrative linked employer-employee
data.
4.1 Municipality data
As far as the municipality data is concerned, we make use of statistics provided by
the official statistical authorities of the 16 German federal states (Statistische Lan-
desa¨mter). The states collect information on all municipalities’ fiscal and budgetary
situation. We combine and harmonize the annual state specific datasets and con-
struct a panel on the universe of municipalities from 1998 to 2008 covering roughly
125,000 data points – i.e., municipality-years. Most importantly, the dataset con-
tains information on the local collection rate, but also information on the population
size and fiscal information on the municipalities’ expenses and revenues. Moreover,
we added regional unemployment rates on a more aggregated level to control for
local labor market conditions.16
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of the municipality data. Our main
variable of interest is the municipalities’ collection rate, τLBT , which is expressed in
15 Since 2008 the denominator of the fraction is set to 1 + τfed · 3.8, since the local business tax
cannot be deducted from its own tax base anymore, but parts of the LBT liabilities can still be
deducted from the PIT, where the multiplier of the basic federal rate changed from 1.8 to 3.8.
16 The few studies on the German business tax find that population size and the share of old
people affect the local business tax rates positively, while the neighboring tax rates only have an
effect on the home tax base if the neighboring municipalities are large (Bu¨ttner, 1999, 2001, 2003).
In addition, there are a couple of microsimulation studies, assessing the potentials of various reform
proposal of the German business tax (Maiterth and Zwick, 2006; Fossen and Bach, 2008).
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percent. The mean (unweighted) collection rate in Germany from 1998 to 2008 is
roughly 330% with a standard deviation of about 40 percentage points.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics - community data
mean sd min max
collection rate (in %) 328.80 36.60 0 900
local unemployment rate (in %) 10.23 5.41 2 31.5
population (in 1000) 7.19 45.38 0 3425.759
There is substantial cross-sectional and time variation in the collection rates.
Figure 2 shows the variation across states and municipality sizes. States such as
North Rhine-Westphalia or Saxony have on average a higher rate, whereas in Hesse
or Brandenburg the rates are lower. To show the within-state variation more directly
Figure 1 in the Appendix depicts Germany’s 11,441 municipalities and the cross-
sectional variation in the collection rates as of the year 2008. The darker colors
indicate municipalities with higher collection rates.17 Figure 2 further shows that,
the bigger the municipality, the higher the collection rate on average. The largest
variation is in the medium-sized municipalities (small cities with a population of
20,000 to 50,000).
17 Note that the black areas in some States (mostly in Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-
Holstein) are due to small municipality sizes and the black border lines.
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Figure 2: Cross-Sectional variation in collection rates
Finally, Table 2 shows how many municipalities have changed their collection
rate during the observation period. As mentioned above, municipalities can adjust
their collection rate at the beginning of each year. Every year, on average 8% of
the municipalities change their collection rate – that is about 1,000 municipalities
per year. As suggested above, most municipalities increase the collection rate over
time and most of the increases in collection rate occurred between 2000 and 2006.
Figure 2 in Appendix A additionally shows the variation of the collection rate over
time separately for each state, demonstrating an upward trend of the collection rate
and increasing variation over time in almost every state.
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Table 2: Share of communities with changing collection rates (in %)
∆τ 6= 0 ∆τ > 0 ∆τ < 0 N
Total 8.1 7.2 .9 114410
by Year
1999 5.4 4.3 1.1 11441
2000 8.4 7.4 1 11441
2001 12.7 11.5 1.3 11441
2002 8.6 7.9 .7 11441
2003 9.8 9.1 .8 11441
2004 8.8 8.2 .6 11441
2005 11 10.4 .7 11441
2006 7.8 7 .8 11441
2007 4.4 3.7 .8 11441
2008 4 3.2 .8 11441
by State
SH 11.1 10.7 .5 11160
HH 0 0 0 10
NI 11.9 11.6 .3 10240
HB 10 10 0 20
NW 13.3 12.6 .6 3960
HE 6.5 5.5 1 4260
RP 8.7 8.4 .3 23060
BW 7.5 7 .5 11010
BA 4.4 3.5 .9 20560
SL 21 10 11 520
BE 10 10 0 10
BB 10.2 7.3 2.9 4190
MV 6 4.2 1.8 8140
SN 11.4 10.1 1.3 4850
ST 12.4 9.9 2.5 3000
TH 3.3 2.8 .6 9420
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4.2 Worker and firm data
For workers and firm information we use the linked employer-employee dataset
(LIAB) provided by the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) in Nuremberg,
Germany (Alda et al., 2005). The employee data are a 2% sample of the admin-
istrative employment statistics of the German Federal Employment Agency (Bun-
desagentur fu¨r Arbeit), called the German employment register, which covers all
employees paying social security contributions or receiving unemployment benefits
(Bender et al., 2000). The employee information are recorded annually on June
30th of each year and include wages, age, tenure, qualification, occupation and em-
ployment type (full-time, part-time or irregular employment). Civil servants are
excluded as they are rarely observed in the social security data. Our worker panel
consists of between 1.6 and 2.0 million workers annually observed from 1998 to
2008.
Importantly, the wages are right censored at the ceiling for the social security
contributions. Although, the ceiling is quite high with e63,400 in 2008 for Western
Germany, more than 10% of the observations are censored. In principle, there are two
ways to tackle this problem: impute the censored wages or exclude the observations.
In contrast to Bauer et al. (2012) we opt for the latter alternative, mainly for two
reasons. First, simply imputing the wages does not suffice since the standard errors
of all regression estimates would have to be adjusted as well. Secondly, given that
the imputation method cannot replicate the true data generating process, imputing
parts of the wages creates an artificial variation in the left-hand side variable, which
might lead to biased conclusions. In fact, if business taxes do affect wages, one
must control for them in the imputation stage and would create endogeneity per
definition. We check the sensitivity of our results with respect to the inclusion of
the censored and imputed wages and find that including the imputed strongly biases
the estimates upward.
Employee information recorded in the data include wages, age, firm specific
tenure, qualification, occupation, employment type (full-time, part-time or marginal
employment), industry and municipality. We use the same skill definition as in the
supply part of the model, differentiating between high, medium and low-skilled
workers. Since we are interested in labor demand dependent on the skill level,
individuals with missing information on qualification are excluded.
The firm component of the LIAB is the IAB Establishment Panel (Ko¨lling,
2000), which is a stratified random sample of the universe of all German estab-
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lishments. The term “establishment” refers to the fact that the observation unit
is the individual plant, not the firm; there can be several plants per firm.18 The
employer data covers establishments with at least one worker for whom social con-
tributions were paid, in 16 industries and establishments from both the former West
and East Germany. The panel dataset contains information on the establishment
structure and personnel decisions from 1993 onwards. We extract the following vari-
ables: value added, investment, number of employees, export share, industry, total
wage bill, legal form, union wage status (industry, firm or no collective agreement in
place), wage payments above the union wage, profitability (measured on a five-point
scale). Per year we observe roughly 12, 000 establishments.
Table 3 shows some descriptive statistics of the linked employer-employee
data.19 The average monthly wage in our sample is e2,460 (all money variables
are in 2008e). As far as worker characteristics are concerned, men are clearly over-
represented. Moreover, the share of full-time workers is large compared to part-
timers and marginally employed. We, therefore, exclude the marginally employed
from the sample. Moreover, 94% of the individuals work in corporate firms. As
non-corporate firms are much smaller on average in our sample (the median num-
ber of workers is 384 as opposed to 1,138 for corporate firms) and as the effective
tax burden for non-corporate and corporate firms differs substantially as shown in
Section 3, we exclude non-corporate firms from our baseline sample and test for
difference in the incidence between corporate and non-corporate firms later in the
analysis.
18 In the context of the German business tax, the tax base of firms with multiple establishments
is divided between municipalities according to formula apportionment based on the wage bill of
the individual establishments.
19 Note that at this stage the imputed wages are still included. They are, however, dropped for
the econometric analyses presented below.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics, LIAB 1998-2008
mean sd min max
monthly wage (in 2008e) 2,466.64 984.31 43.86 26,748.76
age 41.35 9.87 16 64
tenure 10.73 8.10 0 34
share: male 0.77 0.42 0 1
share: migrants 0.09 0.28 0 1
share: high-skilled 0.11 0.32 0 1
share: medium-skilled 0.72 0.45 0 1
share: low-skilled 0.16 0.37 0 1
share: full-timer 0.94 0.23 0 1
share: part-timer 0.06 0.23 0 1
share: marginally emp. 0.00 0.05 0 1
share: blue collar 0.67 0.47 0 1
share: white collar 0.33 0.47 0 1
number of employees 5,697.89 11,665.77 1 50,524
monthly wage bill (in 1,000 2008e) 17,403.52 38,831.98 0 224,777
value added (in 1,000 2008e) 109.30 193.18 0 26,493
investments (in 1,000 2008e) 13.64 35.53 0 8,529
share: non-corporate 0.06 0.25 0 1
share: corporate 0.94 0.25 0 1
share: sector union contract 0.72 0.45 0 1
share: firm union contract 0.15 0.36 0 1
share: no union contract 0.13 0.33 0 1
collection rate (in %) 392.70 55.35 50 520
population (in 1,000) 341.06 654.35 0 3,426
Note: Number of observations: 7,982,240.
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5 Results
In the following section, we estimate the incidence of corporate taxation on wages.
After estimating the baseline model (Section 5.1), we pay special attention to het-
erogeneous worker and firm effects. As far as the workers (Section 5.2) are concerned
there are two channels through which firms can pass the burden of corporate tax-
ation on to their employees. First, they can pay the incumbent workers a lower
wage. Secondly, they can offer new hires a lower pay. For incumbent workers
the incidence most likely materializes through wage moderation since existing work
contracts make wage cuts legally impossible for the contract duration unless renego-
tiation takes place, which is likely to happen only in exceptional cases. In principle,
it would be possible to reduce the wage when (fixed-term) contracts are renewed,
but in nominal terms this is rarely seen in practice. The easiest way to pass the bur-
den of corporate taxation on to the existing workforce is through wage moderation.
Despite nominal downward wage rigidity, real wages decline if nominal wages in-
creases are smaller than increases in the price level. Thus, incumbent workers might
just see fewer pay rises compared to a hypothetical situation without an increase in
the business tax rate. For new hires firms might use a second channel to pass on
the burden. They might pay new hires lower wages than in a situation without an
increase of the corporate tax rate. We will explore the two channels in turn and ad-
ditionally pay attention to worker and firm heterogeneity in the incidence responses
on wages.
5.1 Baseline model
In order to assess the effects of the business tax rates on wages, we estimate a
Mincerian type of wage equation. As dependent variable, we use the log monthly
wage of individual i in firm f , municipality m and year t, lnwifm,t. The independent
variable of interest is municipality m’s collection rate, τm,t. We include up to L lags
of the collection rate to capture the long-term incidence for incumbents (in our
preferred specification L = 2, see below). We further include three sets of control
variables on the worker, firm and municipality level. Controls on the individual
worker level are captured by the vector Xi,t and include age, firm-specific tenure and
skill. On the firm level, we control for the number of employees, output, investment
(all in logs), the export share and we also add industry dummies (Yf,t). Municipality
controls are denoted by Zm,t and comprise the population size, the property tax rate,
local unemployment rates and state dummies. The baseline model thus reads:
14
lnwifm,t =
L∑
l=0
αt−lτm,t−l +βX′i,t +γY′f,t +λZ′m,t +µi +µf +µm +µt + εifm,t (3)
In order to rule out that unobserved time-invariant personal characteristics
such as ability bias our coefficients, we estimate equation (3) using the fixed effects
estimator. To rule out possible selection issues into firms, we first focus on the sub-
sample of firm-stayers, i.e. those workers who do not change jobs under the period
of consideration. We relax this assumption below and look at all workers, paying
special attention to firm switchers below (see Section 5.2). As it turns out the focus
on firm stayers does not affect our results.
Since we look at employees who stay in the firm, the fixed effects estimator
automatically controls for unobserved firm and municipality fixed effect, µf , µm in
this specification. In addition, we add year fixed effects µt.
20
As mentioned in Section 4.2 our baseline sample only contains workers in cor-
porate firms and excludes all workers with imputed wages due to the right-censoring
of the administrative data. Moreover, we exclude marginally employed workers and
drop workers in agricultural industry and the public sector (because most of the
firms are not liable to the business tax).
Since wage adjustment for incumbent workers might take some time due to
legal restrictions, it is important to pay special attention to the timing of the effect
of changes in the business tax rate on wage. To start, we therefore include several
lags of the local collection rate. Table 4 shows the baseline results with varying lag
lengths, L = 0, 1, 2.
In order to calculate the long-term incidence of the business tax on wages we
proceed in two steps. First, we calculate the long-term marginal effect of changes in
the collection rate on wages by adding up the coefficients and providing a t-statistic
for the cumulative effect. Secondly, we transform the long term effect into a wage
elasticity of the marginal effective corporate tax rate, using equation (1). This
wage elasticity measures the wage response (in %) to a 1% increase in the effective
statutory marginal tax rate of the firm.
Table 4 clearly shows that corporate taxation does have a negative effect on
20 Note that the combination of the fixed effects estimator and year fixed effects make the
inclusion of the personal characteristics Xi,t obsolete as they are either time invariant or increasing
annually by one unit.
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wages as implied by the negative cumulative effect of the collection rate in all three
specifications. Secondly, we find that it does matter to take into account at least
one lag of the collection rate. In fact, only controlling for the collection rate in
period t leads to an upward bias (in absolute terms) of the implied elasticity of one
third. One interpretation of this finding is that there might be wage shocks in period
t, which are unrelated to the changes in the corporate tax burden and reversed in
period t+1. Including a second lag of the collection rate does not change coefficients
and elasticities.
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Table 4: Effects on individual wages: lag structure
Model (1) (2) (3)
coll. ratet -0.015
∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
coll. ratet−1 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
coll. ratet−2 -0.001
(0.001)
value added p.c. 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
investment p.c. 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
export share 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
employees 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
local UR -0.199∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
property tax rate -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
community population 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
constant 7.604∗∗∗ 7.578∗∗∗ 7.580∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.055 0.055
Observations 2217452 2217452 2217452
Cumulative effect -0.01544 -0.01138 -0.01171
t-statistic -13.2 -8.1 -7.5
Implied wage elasticity -0.24 -0.18 -0.18
Notes: Fixed effects estimation. Dependent variable: log monthly wage. All specifications
include year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are
0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
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Yet, we include two lags of the collection rate in all subsequent models because
the lag structure might be different for the different worker and firm types analyzed
below. This might especially be true for differences in the collective agreement status
of firms. As collective agreements have been renewed every one to two years during
our sample period, we regard the inclusion of two lags of the collection rate as the
most appropriate specification.
In Table 2 of the Appendix we show how sensitive our estimates are with
respect to the sample selection. We find that the exclusion of firm switchers does
not affect the results. Neither does restricting the sample to workers who do not
change from full-time to part-time. Yet, an important finding is that including
workers with imputed wages due to censoring at the social insurance contribution
ceiling significantly biases the estimates upward. The implied wage elasticity almost
doubles.
5.2 Worker heterogeneity
Next, we turn to heterogenous worker effects. We split the sample into several worker
groups and estimate the incidence on wages for each sub-sample separately. We find
substantial variation in the implied wage elasticity with respect to the effective
marginal corporate tax rate. With respect to qualification, low-skilled labor shares
a much higher burden than medium-skilled labor (implied wage elasticities of −0.57
vs. −0.16).21 Interestingly, high-skilled labor responds equally strongly to changes
in the business tax rate as low-skilled labor. In fact, this u-shaped pattern in the
skill distribution is also found when estimating own-wage labor demand elasticities
on the same data (see Peichl and Siegloch (2012)). The finding might be driven by
the fact that the high-skilled in our sample are a negative selection within the group
of high-skilled, as we excluded the high wage earnings, i.e. those with censored wage
above the social insurance contribution ceiling.
21 High-skilled individuals hold a university, polytechnical or college degree. Medium-skilled
workers have either completed vocational training or obtained the highest German high school
diploma, called the Abitur. Low-skilled workers have neither finished vocational training nor ob-
tained the Abitur.
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When looking at different contract types, we find that the elasticity for part-
timers is much higher in absolute terms than for full-timers. Note, however, that the
variation in working hours is likely to be much higher among the part-time workers
so that the estimated elasticity could well be a combined wage and hours effect.
Unfortunately, we do not have hour information in the LIAB data except for the
broad full-time vs. part-time classification.
Intuitively, we find that especially the workers with low firm-specific tenure
bear a relatively larger share of the burden, while merited workers with a long firm-
specific tenure do not suffer from wage decreases following rises in the corporate
tax burden. As far as gender is concerned, we find that women bear a much higher
burden of the corporate tax then men. Moreover, the implied wage elasticity for
white collar workers is much higher in absolute terms than for blue collar workers.
Overall, our results suggest that more vulnerable (low-skilled, women, part-
timers, low-firm tenure) share a relatively higher burden of the corporate tax. These
findings could be driven by the lower bargaining power of these specific groups and
a higher (absolute) own wage labor demand elasticity.
So far we have analyzed the incidence on incumbent workers. As argued above
this incidence materializes through wage moderation as firms face legal restrictions
and can hardly change existing work contracts. An additional channel for firms to
pass on the burden of higher corporate taxation is to pay new hires lower wages
than in a hypothetical situation without an increase of the corporate tax rate. To
test this channel, we slightly modify model (3) and regress the log monthly wage
lnwifc,t on a dummy, REFc,t, that equals one if municipality m has increased its
collection rate from year t − 1 to t. In addition, we include a dummy, NHi,t, that
indicates that individual i is a new hire, i.e. that she changed jobs from t − 1 to t.
This dummy captures the fact that firm switchers are clearly a selected group and
different from firm stayers. To capture the wage incidence of the business tax for new
hires we interact the “reform” and “new hire” dummy: IAim,t = REFm,t·NHi,t. The
interaction term, IAic,t, measures the wage premium or penalty of workers that start
the job in a firm that has recently faced an increase in the corporate tax burden
compared to new hires of a firm whose business tax rate has remained constant.
As done in model 3, we additionally control for personal, firm and municipality
characteristics (Xi,t, Yf,t, Zm,t). Our empirical specification is thus:
lnwifm,t = α0 + α1NHi,t + α2REFm,t + α3IAim,t
+βX′i,t + γY′f,t + λZ′m,t + µi + µf + µm + µt + εifm,t. (4)
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Again, we apply the fixed effects estimator to wipe out individual fixed effects
µi. To control for unobserved personal characteristics is especially important in
the context of this specification since the identifying assumption of our model is
that firm switchers do not select into firms based on whether there has been a
change in the local business tax rate. In this model demeaning the data does not
automatically wipe out firm and community fixed effects (µf , µm) as we do not
restrict our analysis to firm stayers. Thus, we include firm and community dummies
in different specifications below. Again, we add year fixed effects (µt) in all models.
Table 6 shows the results. When controlling for worker fixed effects, we find
a very similar overall elasticity to the one shown in specification of (1) of Table 4.
Yet, the interaction is not significantly different from zero once we control for worker
fixed and firm or community fixed. This implies that there does not seem to be an
additional penalty for new hires in the form of a lower wage.
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Table 6: Firm switchers: person, firm, community FE
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
new hire -0.085∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
reform 0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
new hire ∗ reform 0.010 0.010∗∗ -0.000 0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
age 0.023∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age squared -0.024∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
foreigner -0.014∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
male 0.170∗∗∗
(0.001)
medium-skilled -0.185∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
low-skilled -0.294∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
blue collar -0.118∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
value added p.c. 0.034∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
investment p.c. 0.014∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
export share 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
local UR -0.527∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
property tax rate 0.029∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
community population 0.032∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗´ 0.002 0.009∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
worker fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
firm fixed effects No No No Yes
community fixed effects No No Yes No
Adjusted R2 0.474 0.080 0.089 0.094
Observations 3311484 3311484 3311484 3311484
Implied wage elasticity 0.38 -0.26 -0.25 -0.27
Notes: Dependent variable: log monthly wage. All specifications include year, state and
industry fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are 0.1
(*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
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5.3 Firm heterogeneity
It is very important to test for firm heterogeneity in the corporate tax incidence
on wages. First of all, we check whether wage elasticities differ by legal form. As
stressed in Section 3 both corporate and non-corporate firms are liable to the local
business tax, but the overall tax burden on firms differs considerably because profits
of non-corporate firms are subject to the personal income tax while corporations pay
corporate tax. So far we have focused on corporate firms, which are over-represented
in our sample and are, in addition, much larger than non-corporate firms (see Section
4.2). Another reason is that many non-corporate firms (especially the small ones) do
not pay business taxes due to an allowance and other exemptions in the tax code.
Indeed, Table 7 shows that the wage effect of the local business tax is com-
pletely different for non-corporate firms. In fact, we find a positive effect on wages.22
We therefore decided to exclude non-corporate firms from all preceding and subse-
quent analyses. One potential interpretation of the positive coefficient is that owners
of non-corporate firms might decide to pay themselves a higher wage as a response
to an increase in the local business tax. Unfortunately, we are not able to test this
hypothesis directly with our data.
22 Note that it is not as straightforward to calculate the effective marginal tax rate for non-
corporate firms due to certain size-related allowances in the business tax code and due to the
progressive personal income tax schedule.
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Table 7: Effects on individual wages: Results by legal form
Model (1) (2)
Company type Corporate Non-corporate
coll. ratet -0.020
∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.005)
coll. ratet−1 0.009∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.004)
coll. ratet−2 -0.001 0.030∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.004)
value added p.c. 0.001∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001)
investment p.c. 0.002∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
export share 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
employees 0.048∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.005)
local UR -0.197∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗
(0.009) (0.053)
property tax rate -0.019∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.004)
community population 0.014∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.001) (0.004)
constant 7.580∗∗∗ 7.301∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.058)
year fixed effects Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.041
Observations 2217452 124872
Cumulative effect -0.01171 0.08207
t-statistic -7.5 10.4
Notes: Fixed effects estimation. Dependent variable: log monthly wage. All specifications
include year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are
0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
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Similar to Section 5.2, we test for heterogenous firm effects by splitting the
sample into subgroups and re-estimating the model. As Table 8 reveals, we find
remarkable differences when splitting by industry affiliation. We do not find a
negative effect of the business tax rate on wages for the construction industry and
even a positive effect in the mining and energy sector. In contrast, firms in the
service sector seem to pass the burden of corporate taxation to workers much more
strongly, with an absolute wage elasticity exceeding one.
As mentioned above firms might face restrictions when trying to shift the
tax burden to their workers. One of these restrictions are collective bargaining
agreements regarding the wages. In Germany, there are two types of collective
agreements: one is at the industry level, the other at the firm level.23 We find that
firms under sector level union contracts do have a relatively smaller wage elasticity
compared to companies under a firm level contract. An interpretation of this result
is that if only firm f in municipality m faces an increased collection rate, but the tax
burdens for all other firms in industry s remain unchanged, it is less likely that this
single change will affect the wage bargaining result when the collective agreement is
renegotiated. In contrast, when a company under a firm level collective agreement
faces a higher tax burden, it can react directly when the agreement is renewed.
Surprisingly, we find that firms that are not covered by a collective agreement at all
do not seem to shift the burden to labor. Following the our argument, we would have
expected an even higher effect for this group as there are no binding restrictions. In
fact, we find a significant and positive effect of the collection rate on wages. One
possible explanation is that some firms covered by sector level collective bargaining
agreements pay wages in excess of the minimum stipulated by the sectoral agreement
while others do not.
We therefore split the firms that have a collective agreement into a group that
pays wages above the wage level stipulated in the respective agreement and into
another group that where the union wage is binding. In line with economic intuition,
we find that firms that pay wages above the wage fixed in collective bargaining shift
the burden much more strongly with a wage elasticity of −0.37. Those firms actually
are able to react to changes in the corporate tax burden, by reducing the wages, via
wage moderation, until they hit the wage rate set up in the collective agreement.
Firms where the union wage is already binding do not have this possibility. We
indeed find that the wage elasticity is much smaller (−0.06) and not significantly
different from zero.
23 In general, it is mostly larger firms that have firm level collective agreements.
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Last we use a measure of the self-assessed profitability of the firm in the preced-
ing year. We find that firms that face no problems at all and assess their profitability
as “very good” do not shift the burden of corporate taxation to their employees. In
contrast, firms that assess their profit situation as “sufficient” show a much higher
wage elasticity of −1.12. Interestingly, the effect of the collection rate on wage for
firms that have a poor profitability is positive and significant.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we use administrative linked employer-employee data and multiple
local business tax reforms to demonstrate how firms pass on the burden of corporate
taxation to the workers. We find that wage moderation plays an important role. A
1% increase in the effective marginal corporate tax rate leads to a 0.18% decrease
in the wages of incumbent workers. A second channel through which firms can shift
the burden is to offer new hires a relatively lower wage. Our results suggest that
this channel is less important.
In addition, the high-quality data allow us to identify worker and firm hetero-
geneity regarding the business tax incidence on wages. While the wages of workers
with medium skills are hardly affected by changes in the local business tax, the high
and low-skilled bear a larger share of the burden. Moreover, we find that women,
part-timers and individuals with low firm specific tenure bear a relatively higher
share of the business tax burden.
As far as firm heterogeneity is concerned we find very different incidence results
for corporate firms compared to non-corporate firms. This finding might be driven
by the fact that non-corporate firms are much smaller and often do not pay local
business taxes. Moreover, business owners might be able to shift income from profits
to their own (executive) wages more easily in smaller, non-corporate firms to avoid
(parts of the) corporate tax burden. In addition, we find that firms shift a larger
share of tax burden to their workers if the wage bargaining takes place at the firm
level rather than at the sectoral level and if the collective agreement is not binding,
i.e. wages exceed the minimum wage stipulated in the agreement. Moreover, more
profitable firms seem to shift less of the burden.
Our finding has important policy implications. If proposals of higher taxes on
firms are brought forward as a means of redistribution (following the old-fashioned
antagonism between labor and capital), one should keep in mind that labor does
suffer when corporate taxes are increased. In particular, it is low skilled labor that
bears a high share of the labor burden, which is important to take into account
when trying to achieve redistributive objectives.
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Table 2: Effects on individual wages: Robustness w.r.t sample
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm stayers Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Contract stayers Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclude censored wages Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Exclude East No No No No Yes No
Exclude wage outliers No No No No No Yes
coll. ratet -0.020
∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
coll. ratet−1 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
coll. ratet−2 -0.001 -0.003∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.012∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
value added p.c. 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
investment p.c. 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
export share 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
employees 0.048∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
local UR -0.197∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ 0.013 -0.084∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009)
property tax rate -0.019∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
community population 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
constant 7.580∗∗∗ 7.573∗∗∗ 7.766∗∗∗ 7.636∗∗∗ 7.674∗∗∗ 7.521∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.024) (0.013)
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.045 0.037 0.055 0.057 0.101
Observations 2217452 2293468 2751020 2256576 1549023 1996050
Cumulative effect -0.01171 -0.01297 -0.01994 -0.01227 -0.01181 -0.00948
t-statistic -7.5 -7.9 -11.6 -7.8 -5.3 -6.6
Implied wage elasticity -0.18 -0.20 -0.32 -0.19 -0.19 -0.15
Notes: Fixed effects estimation. Dependent variable: log monthly wage. All specifications
include year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are
0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
35
Oxford University Centre for Business 
Taxation 
Working Paper series 
 
WP12/15 Michael Devereux Issues in the Design of Taxes on 
Corporate Profit 
 
WP12/14 Alan Auerbach and Michael Devereux Consumption 
Taxes In An International Setting 
 
WP12/13 Wiji Arulampalam, Michael Devereux and Federica 
Liberini Taxes and the location of targets 
 
WP12/12 Scott Dyreng, Bradley Lindsey and Jacob Thornock 
Exploring the role Delaware plays as a tax haven 
 
WP12/11 Katarzyna Bilicka and Clemens Fuest With which 
countries do tax havens share information? 
 
WP12/10  Giorgia Maffini Territoriality, Worldwide Principle, 
and 
Competitiveness of Multinationals: A Firm-level Analysis of Tax 
Burdens 
 
WP12/09 Daniel Shaviro The rising tax-electivity of US residency 
 
WP12/08 Edward D Kleinbard Stateless Income 
 
WP12/07 Vilen Lipatov and Alfons Weichenrieder Optimal income 
taxation with tax competition 
 
WP12/06 Kevin S Markle A Comparison of the Tax-motivated 
Income Shifting of Multinationals in Territorial and 
Worldwide Countries 
 
WP12/05 Li Liu Income Taxation and Business Incorporation: 
Evidence from the Early Twentieth Century 
 
WP12/04 Shafik Hebous and Vilen Lipatov A Journey from a 
Corruption Port to a Tax Haven 
 
WP12/03 Neils Johannesen Strategic line drawing between debt 
and equity 
 
WP12/02 Chongyang Chen, Zhonglan Dai, Douglas A. 
Shackelford and Harold H. Zhang, Does Financial Constraint 
Affect Shareholder Taxes and the Cost of Equity Capital? 
WP12/01 Stephen R. Bond and Irem Guceri, Trends in UK BERD 
after the Introduction of R&D Tax Credits 
 
WP11/24 Michael Devereux and Simon Loretz How would EU 
corporate tax reform affect US investment in Europe? 
WP11/23 Krautheim, Sebastian and Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr 
Wages and International Tax Competition 
WP11/22 Haufler, Andreas, Pehr-Johan Nörback and Lars 
Persson Entrepreneurial innovation and taxation 
 
WP11/21 Mancini, Raffaele, Paolo M. Panteghini and Maria laura 
Parisi Debt-Shifting in Europe 
 
WP11/20 Xing, Jing Does tax structure affect economic growth? 
Empirical evidence from OECD countries 
 
WP11/19 Freedman, Judith Responsive regulation, risk and rules: 
applying the theory to tax practice 
 
WP11/18 Devereux, Michael P. and Simon Loretz How would EU 
corporate tax reform affect US investment in Europe? 
 
WP11/17 Vella, John, Clemens Fuest and Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr 
Response on EU proposal for a Financial Transaction Tax 
 
WP11/16 Loretz, Simon and Socrates Mokkas Evidence for 
profit-shifting with tax sensitive capital stocks 
 
WP11/15 Weisenbach, david A. Carbon taxation in the EU: 
Expanding EU carbon price 
 
WP11/14 Bauer, Christian, Davies, Ronald B. and Andreas Hauer 
Economic Integration and the Optimal Corporate Tax 
Structure with Heterogeneous Firms 
 
WP11/13 Englisch, Joachim National Measures to Counter Tax 
Avoidance under the Merger Directive 
 
WP11/12 de la Feria, Rita and Clemens Fuest Closer to an 
Internal Market? The Economic Effects of EU Tax Jurisprudence 
 
WP11/11 Englisch, Joachim EU Perspective on VAT Exemptions 
 
WP11/10 Riedel, Nadine and Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch 
Asymmetric Obligations 
 
WP11/09 Böhm, Tobias and Nadine Riedel On Selection into 
Public Civil Service 
 
WP11/08 Auerbach, Alan J. and Michael P. Devereux Consumption 
and Cash-Flow Taxes in an International Setting 
 
WP11/07 Becker, Johannes and Clemens Fuest Tax Competition: 
M&A versus Greenfield Investment 
 
WP11/06 Riedel, Nadine Taxing Multinationals under Union 
Wage Bargaining 
 
WP11/05 Liu, Li and Rosanne Altshuler Measuring the Burden of 
the Corporate Income Tax under Imperfect Competition 
 
WP11/04 Becker, Johannes and Clemens Fuest The Taxation of 
Foreign Profits - The Old View, the New View, and a Pragmatic 
View 
 
WP11/03 Konrad, Kai Search Costs and Corporate Income Tax 
Competition 
 
WP11/02 Hellerstein,Walter Comparing the Treatment of 
Charities Under Value Added Taxes and Retail Sales Taxes 
 
WP11/01 Dharmapala, Dhammika and Nadine Riedel Earnings 
Shocks and Tax-Motivated Income-Shifting: Evidence from 
European Multinationals 
 
WP10/23 Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim Towards a Theory of Trade 
Finance 
 
WP10/22 Freedman, Judith and John Vella HMRC's Management 
of the UK Tax System: The Boundaries of Legitimate Discretion 
 
WP10/21 de la Feria, Rita Reverberation of Legal Principles: 
Further Thoughts on the Development of an EU Principle of 
Prohibition of Abuse of Law 
 
WP10/20 Hauer, Andreas and Frank Stähler Tax competition in a 
simple model with heterogeneous firms: How larger markets 
reduce profit taxes 
 
WP10/19 Cnossen, Sijbren Improving the VAT Treatment of 
Exempt Immovable Property in the European Union 
 
WP10/18 Grubert, Harry and Richard Krever VAT and Financial 
Supplies: What should be taxed? 
 
WP10/17 Gendron, Pierre-Pascal VAT Treatment of Public Sector 
Bodies: The Canadian Model 
 
WP10/16 Niepmann, Friederike and Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr Bank 
Bailouts, International Linkages and Cooperation 
 
WP10/15 Bond, Stephen and Jing Xing Corporate taxation and 
capital accumulation 
 
WP10/14 Lockwood, Ben How should financial intermediation 
services be taxed? 
 
WP10/13 Becker, Johannes, Fuest, Clemens and Nadine Riedel 
Corporate tax effects on the quality and quantity of FDI 
 
WP10/12 Fuest, Clemens and Nadine Riedel Tax Evasion and Tax 
Avoidance in Developing Countries: The Role of International 
Profit Shifting 
 
WP10/11 Wildasin, David E. State Corporation Income Taxation: 
An Economic Perspective on Nexus 
 
WP10/10 Becker, Johannes and Marco Runkel Corporate tax 
regime and international allocation of ownership 
 
WP10/09 Simpson, Helen How do firms' outward FDI strategies 
relate to their activity at home? Empirical evidence for the UK 
 
WP10/08 Voget, Johannes, Headquarter Relocations and 
International Taxation 
 
WP10/07 Devereux, Michael P. and Simon Loretz Evaluating 
Neutrality Properties of Corporate Tax Reforms 
 
WP10/06 Davies, Ronald B. and Lourenço S. Paz, Tarifs Versus VAT 
in the Presence of Heterogeneous Firms and an Informal Sector 
 
WP10/05 Finke, Katharina, Heckemeyer, Jost H., Reister Timo and 
Christoph Spengel Impact of Tax Rate Cut Cum Base Broadening 
Reforms on Heterogeneous Firms - Learning from the German 
Tax Reform 2008 
 
WP10/04 Koh, Hyun-Ju and Nadine Riedel Do Governments Tax 
Agglomeration Rents? 
 
WP10/03 Dischinger, Matthias and Nadine Riedel The Role of 
Headquarters in Multinational Profit Shifting Strategies 
 
WP10/02 Vrijburg, Hendrik and Ruud A. de Mooij Enhanced 
Cooperation in an asymmetric model of Tax Competition 
 
WP10/01 Bettendorf, Leon, van der Horst Albert, de Mooij, Ruud 
A. and Hendrik 
Vrijburg, Corporate tax consolidation and enhanced 
cooperation in the European Union 
 
WP09/32 Bettendorf, Leon, Devereux, Michael P., van der Horst, 
Albert, Loretz, 
Simon and Ruud A. de Mooij Corporate tax harmonization in 
the EU 
 
WP09/31 Karkinsky, Tom and Nadine Riedel Corporate Taxation 
and the Choice 
of Patent Location within Multinational Firms 
 
WP09/30 Becker, Johannes and Clemens Fuest Transfer Pricing 
Policy and the 
Intensity of Tax Rate Competition 
